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Abstract: 
Abstract: This article is an introduction to a special issue on ‘Contexts of Religious Tolerance: New Perspectives 
from Early Modern Britain and Beyond’, which contains essays on the contributions to the debates on tolerance 
by non-canonical philosophers and theologians, mainly from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland and 
England. Among the studied authors are the Aberdeen Doctors, Samuel Rutherford, James Dundas, John Finch, 
George Keith, John Simson, Archibald Campbell, Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull and John Witherspoon. 
The introduction draws attention to several methodological points connected to the decision to look at the debates 
on tolerance through the prism of rarely studied authors. It then presents the essays, which offer novel perspectives 
by analysing and contextualising political, religious and moral treatments of tolerance. These are tied especially 
to debates on the articles of faith and on their status, on confessions of faith and their role in the quest for orthodoxy, 
on liberty of conscience, and on the relation between church and state. 
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1. Early modern tolerance: narratives and gaps 
 
Most commentators will readily agree that tolerance was a central issue in the early modern 
period, especially in philosophy, theology, politics and law. Tolerance is here tentatively 
understood as non-intervention and enduring acceptance of certain objectionable differences 
on the basis of overriding reasons. These reasons consist in most cases in the pragmatic 
preference of a political state of peace and economic prosperity over the turmoil of war, or, 
arguably in much fewer cases, in principled considerations concerning virtue or justice.1 The 
paradigmatic early modern context of debates concerning tolerance was undoubtedly religion: 
in the sixteenth century, the Reformation had confronted Europe with entirely new 
dimensions of conflict and war, which had repercussions for several centuries and provoked a 
broad range of responses, including theoretical defences of tolerance and, in some cases, 
political enactments of tolerance.2 Debates on tolerance regarding religion predominantly 
concerned the question of how institutions such as the state and the church should deal with 
one another, with dissent and dissenters, and especially with so-called ‘heterodox’, ‘heretical’, 
or otherwise significantly different groups and individuals. In parallel to this more political 
angle, there was also the question of whether and how tolerance could be a moral virtue of an 
agent. This question was mainly seen through the prism of specific scriptural passages, 
recommending meekness and forbearance as a Christian virtue. If ‘tolerance’ and ‘toleration’ 
are sometimes distinguished (for example by treating the former as the moral virtue, and by 
reserving the latter for politics of non-intervention by the state), this distinction seems to have 
been neither systematic nor commonplace in the early modern Anglophone context, and it 
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should be further contextualised especially in a period when the Latin language, which did not 
make any such distinction, was still crucial for most larger intellectual conversations (see also 
Section 2).   
 Relatively few early modern thinkers dominate present-day general narratives and in-
depth analyses of early modern theories of tolerance. Consider Rainer Forst’s important book 
Toleration in Conflict: Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).3 
Forst presents an extensive philosophical history of the debates on toleration/tolerance from 
the Stoics and early Christianity to the twentieth century, and adds his own systematic 
account. As far as the early modern period is concerned, Forst pays most attention to the 
undoubted pillars of seventeenth-century debates on tolerance: Baruch Spinoza (quasi the 
paradigm of Dutch toleration theories and politics), John Locke (the paradigm of English 
toleration theories and politics – exemplified by the Toleration Act of 1689) and Pierre Bayle 
(the paradigmatic intellectual reaction to French politics of intolerance – exemplified by the 
revocation of the Edit de Nantes in 1685). As far as the Anglophone seventeenth century is 
concerned, Forst also pays attention to Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, William Penn and 
Jonas Proast, who penned at least parts of their theories of tolerance in English – but no other 
English, and no Scottish thinkers are mentioned. When it comes to the eighteenth century and 
the Enlightenment, Forst focuses on the situation in France and Germany, but he skips the 
post-Lockean intellectual landscape in England and Scotland. Needless to say, any more 
comprehensive history of the debates on tolerance will have to focus on some authors and 
leave out some others – any such history will thus leave us with blind spots. Yet these blind 
spots are precisely what the present issue wants to track, in an attempt to contribute new 
insights regarding less studied or even entirely unknown participants in the debates on 
tolerance in early modern Britain. 
 The contributors to this special issue are not the first to emphasise that too narrow a 
focus on a small number of well-explored classical figures engenders the risk of leaving us 
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with regrettable omissions in the broader history of the debates on tolerance, and of producing 
partial or even distorted views of the role of tolerance in the early modern intellectual 
discourse.4 As far as Britain is concerned, here are some of the main gaps in the 
historiography of the debates on tolerance: regarding the seventeenth century, the focus on 
Locke and on some few other English and American thinkers has almost entirely eclipsed the 
debates for and against tolerance in Scotland. Similarly, the quite apposite presentation of 
Locke as one of the culmination points of the debates on tolerance in Britain, as well as the 
focus on eighteenth-century French and German debates on tolerance have drawn attention 
away from the British eighteenth century. Especially with the situation ensuing the Toleration 
Act of 1689, the continental perspective on Britain was that it was a forerunner in toleration 
politics. Did this enactment of comparatively tolerant political principles really lead to a 
relative absence in Britain of intellectual debates on tolerance, debates which can be found in 
eighteenth-century France centring around figures like Voltaire, or in eighteenth-century 
Germany around Moses Mendelssohn? 
 Comparing eighteenth-century Britain to eighteenth-century Continental Europe and to 
seventeenth-century Britain may cause the impression that post-Lockean Britain, there was a 
relative silence regarding tolerance. This impression may not be entirely false, yet we must 
note the presence of numerous debates on tolerance in Britain apart from the most famous 
ones. Furthermore, there were numerous intellectuals from Britain moving between 
geographical regions, countries and continents – as well as between religious denominations. 
Without any possible aspirations to completeness, this special issue brings together case 
studies on several such previously neglected figures, and in some cases even on undiscussed 
material from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain and beyond. It has the aim of 
offering some novel perspectives on selected philosophical and theological thinkers and their 
contexts, perspectives which may subsequently serve to fine-tune or question established 




2. Comments on method 
 
The title of this special issue suggests that arguments for and against religious tolerance 
are highly dependent on their contexts. The following metaphor, borrowed from Louisiane 
Ferlier’s paper, may serve as a description of the general aim of this special issue: that of 
composing parts of a wider ‘intellectual geography’ of religious tolerance. This expression 
draws attention to the fact that arguments are situated in space and time: that the when and 
where are as important as who proposed a given argument, for what purposes, and for which 
audiences. Such considerations are especially true with respect to the highly sensitive debates 
on religious tolerance: Sir George Mackenzie (1636/38–1691) lamented that Confessions of 
Faith ‘like ordinary Dyals, serve only for use in that one Meridian for which they are 
calculated, and by riding twenty Miles ye make them Heterodox.’ (Mackenzie 1711, 85) The 
contributors to this special issue have thus paid particular attention to diverse contexts in 
which arguments for and against tolerance were conceived, expressed, exchanged, received, 
as well as modified. Before describing the most pertinent contexts in Section 3, some brief 
methodological considerations are in order. 
A first methodological point concerns language. The English language is arguably 
unique in making the distinction between ‘toleration’ and ‘tolerance’, where the latter often 
seems to have a moral and psychological sense, and the former a political sense (as in the so-
called Toleration Act). This distinction is today somewhat more established than in the 
seventeenth century, when the notion of forbearance was often used to refer to tolerance in the 
sense of the moral virtue. The Pauline Epistles in their Greek, Latin and English versions 
were central with their vocabulary to recommend to adopt a spirit of meekness (Gal. 6:1), to 
forbear one another in love (Eph. 4:2), and to forbear and forgive one another (Col. 3:13). In 
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Latin versions of the Bible, Paul’s Greek term prautês was often rendered as patientia, 
mansuetudo, lenitas and tolerantia. And even if English was the main language of the authors 
discussed, Latin was doubtless very much part of their intellectual landscape. The wide 
dimensions of the outlined semantic field remind us that it is crucial to include the religious 
and moral background when analysing early modern debates on tolerance. In this special 
issue, the contributions by Burton, Gellera and Hutton are especially relevant when it comes 
to the connections between forbearance and tolerance, which are suggested by scriptural 
passages.  
A second methodological observation concerns the potentially problematic 
consequences of the largely arbitrary temporal separation between the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth centuries, which marks several histories of philosophy. The former is typically 
considered as characterised by religious strife, the entanglement of politics and religion, and 
the latter as the century of the secured possession of the peace and constitutional settlement 
reached after the so-called Glorious Revolution (1688). Often, histories of philosophy would 
have separate volumes on the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, while histories of 
theology have showed relatively little interest for the eighteenth century altogether.6 This 
special issue tackles the practice of studying the two centuries as separate entities. Quite 
tellingly, scholars have increasingly debated this temporal division. In Scottish studies for 
example, ‘the long seventeenth century’ spans from the Reformation to the early 
Enlightenment, while some have suggested that the period is better delineated as the short 
seventeenth century between the two religious revolutions of 1638 and 1688/9 rather than the 
‘political’ events of 1603 and 1707.7 Eighteenth century scholars have, in turn, often reached 
back into the seventeenth century in their search for the origins of the Enlightenment.  
On a related note, one should not ignore the word of caution by Harris and Garrett about 
identifying the eighteenth century with ‘the Enlightenment’: an essential part of ‘the 
Enlightenment’ was a wider dialogue with parts of society which were not necessarily 
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‘enlightened’ in the sense of subscribing to the intellectual projects adopted by figures 
commonly counted amongst those of the Enlightenment.8 A fruitful historiographical 
approach is proposed for example by Sarah Hutton, according to whom paying attention to 
what she calls ‘philosophical conversations’ helps to better grasp important continuities 
between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.9 If only because several of the authors 
discussed here lived in both the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, this special issue 
provides case studies of intellectual conversations which connect these two centuries.  
Clearly, this is not incompatible with acknowledging that century-specific research can 
provide important breakthroughs. This is especially true when the subject-matter is uniquely 
under-explored, and such was, and to a large extent still is, seventeenth-century Scottish 
philosophy. One example of a finally eroding prejudice is that seventeenth-century Scotland 
was a fundamentally backward nation whose Calvinism was ‘grim and mean’.10 Recent works 
have done much in the direction of uncovering the lively philosophical and theological 
developments in seventeenth-century Scotland.11 This special issue contributes to this 
narrative from the so far little investigated perspective of religious tolerance.  
Similar considerations apply to a third point: our dealing with geographical borders, 
especially the one between Scotland and England, which has sometimes produced divided 
historiographies. Some of the authors studied here, however, moved within Britain as well as 
beyond, to America, Italy, Turkey and the United Provinces. They found new intellectual 
contexts in the countries they moved to, and established a relation with them which was 
sometimes significant enough as to change them. But, already inhabited as they were, these 
new contexts also had the effect of changing some perspectives in the newcomers. Especially 
in the cases of Keith (Ferlier), Finch (Hutton), and Witherspoon (Foster), one sees the proper 
geographical sense of the aforementioned ‘intellectual geography’ of religious tolerance. A 
world traveller such as Keith brought with him his native Aberdeen and the tense debates 
about religion he witnessed there in his youth; but he also changed as he travelled to diverse 
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contexts, there and back again. Likewise, Finch enriched his views also thanks to his 
experience of the Italian and Ottoman societies, most different from his native England: 
however, as Hutton suggests, these experiences bore direct influence back in England on 
Finch’s nephew, Daniel Finch, who was responsible for the Toleration Act. Witherspoon 
experienced how different the conditions for an ‘established’ church could be in Scotland and 
in New Jersey. Neither does the metaphor of the ‘intellectual geography’ lose its validity in 
the case of authors who did not travel much, since they usually transcended the specific 
perspectives of their native region: the Aberdeen Doctors (Denlinger) and Rutherford 
(Burton), for example, expressed their opposite positions regarding tolerance not only with 
Scotland, but also with England and their echoes in Europe in mind. 
A fourth point concerns our attention to changes within and shifts between religious 
denominations. Virtually all of the authors investigated here witnessed at least one major 
confessional shift. James Dundas (Gellera), for example, grew up as a Presbyterian, went on 
to signing the National Covenant in 1639, served as an MP in the strongly Covenanting 1649-
51 Scottish Parliament, but ended up excluded from public life for not complying with the 
Restoration anti-Presbyterian laws of 1661-63. In the quite unique case of Keith, several 
denominational shifts occurred in the very same person: we see him as a Presbyterian and 
Quaker in 1650s Aberdeen and in the American colonies, then returning to England and 
converting to Latitudinarian Anglicanism. During these confessional shifts, Keith maintained 
that his core beliefs were unaltered. By following the trails of these changes, both societal and 
personal, an even more complex portrait of early modern Britain’s religious identities can be 
drawn: undeniably partisan and conflictual, but also at times surprisingly permeable and 
shifting. The movements of travellers also evoke the fact that, on the path to a new identity, 
they lived to varying degrees an uprooted or dislodged existence: not every new immigrant 
was the Principal of Princeton College, or the Ambassador of Britain to Italy and Turkey. 
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One further aim of this special issue has been to shed light on some relatively ‘minor’ 
authors, who may not have exerted much influence in their own time, and who are not widely 
studied nowadays. Yet the contexts of tolerance were also animated by such thinkers, who 
received, reinterpreted and sometimes perhaps misinterpreted the great arguments and views 
of their time. Focussing on the background of a picture in turn helps clarify what is in its 
centre. On account of the variety of contexts, our approach had to be interdisciplinary, 
combining theology, philosophy and intellectual history. The contributions leave the beaten 
track of the authors and sources typically investigated, in order to look into a wealth of 
‘minor’ authors and sources (manuscripts, minutes, correspondences, sermons), which helps 
to collectively present a fuller picture of the early modern debates about religious tolerance. 
 
 
3. Important contexts for arguments on tolerance 
 
There are only a few treatises in early modern British philosophy and theology which 
are primarily dedicated to discussions of arguments for and against tolerance, and even fewer 
treatises indicating such a thematic focus in their very title. Famously, several of Locke’s 
writings develop elaborate philosophical arguments in favour of tolerance –albeit a 
notoriously somewhat limited conception of it– and Rutherford’s Free Disputation Against 
Pretended Liberty of Conscience (1649) presents theological arguments mostly against 
tolerance. Yet the scarcity of other treatises from Britain dedicated to tolerance may be 
thought to undermine the claim that tolerance was a central theme not only in early modern 
philosophical, theological and political debates on the Continent, but also in Britain. Once we 
shift attention to tolerance’s immediate vicinity, however, we find numerous relevant debates, 
which sometimes do not even employ the typical vocabulary of tolerance. The contributions 
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to this special issue undertake such a shift in focus, and the following thematic contexts, 
which are often overlapping, emerge as most pertinent for the issue of tolerance. 
First, arguments for and against tolerance frequently occupy important roles in 
theological debates on the articles of faith and their status, and in debates concerning the 
distinction between those articles of faith which ought to be considered essential or 
fundamental, and those which are merely non-fundamental or indifferent – the so-called 
adiaphora.12 Deviations from the former were thought to constitute problematic forms of 
religious dissent, heterodoxies or even heresies, whereas disagreements on the latter were 
considered by many to concern less important aspects of faith, bearing no real weight when it 
comes to the one matter that really counts: salvation. So in principle, arguing that an article of 
faith is non-fundamental could imply that tolerating dissent on it is appropriate – but 
especially during the seventeenth century, the exact dividing line between adiaphora and 
essential articles constituted a constant battleground. Amongst others, the contributions by 
Denlinger on the Aberdeen Doctors, by Burton on Rutherford, and by Gellera on Dundas 
concern this theme. 
Arguments concerning the status of the articles of faith often combined with more 
general concerns about confessions of faith, and about orthodoxy, heterodoxy and heresy. 
These concepts deeply marked the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Detailed 
confessions were drafted and imposed on the members of different churches. Especially the 
Confession of Faith drafted in the Westminster Assembly of Divines (1643–1647) is crucial 
for several papers in the present issue. In connection with the confessions, which cemented 
standards of orthodoxy, practices of subscription were enacted, theological committees 
founded, and public debates on specific articles of faith reached a high point. Yet then again, 
the confessions and tendencies to enforce orthodoxy and specific interpretations of scripture 
were themselves subject to criticism. Especially (but not exclusively) in the early eighteenth 
century, over-rigid concerns with confessions of faith were opposed. Philosophers as well as 
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theologians insisted that confessions were man-made fallible documents, and that the 
categories of orthodoxy, heterodoxy and heresy were too vague and too politicised to be tools 
for the advancement of faith.13 Such criticisms went along with arguments in favour of 
tolerating at least certain forms of religious dissent, and sometimes even with arguments for a 
more general obligation of state and church to foster an open debate in order to advance 
humankind in religious matters. In this special issue, Burton focuses on Samuel Rutherford, 
who was one of the authors of the Westminster Confession of Faith, and whose Free 
Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience (1649) –profoundly critical of 
toleration– immediately followed his work on the Confession. The contributions by Maurer 
and Foster focus on the role of the Confession in eighteenth-century debates. 
The theological distinction between essential and indifferent articles of faith, then, may 
also be interpreted as a distinction between what really matters when it comes to religious 
faith and salvation, and what is less important. And this latter distinction may be connected to 
debates about whether what really matters in religion is actually a core of morality, or the 
morally virtuous life more generally. Debates on this latter claim, which ‘reduces’ religion to 
morality, emerge to prominence in the eighteenth century, with various eighteenth-century 
philosophers as well as theologians famously arguing that we should be primarily concerned 
about living a life of charity, and not about being doctrinally orthodox.14 Such a position may 
again encourage tolerance regarding at least certain differences in religious doctrine. By other 
thinkers, however, this idea was immediately repudiated and connected to heresies. Besides 
their obvious roles in eighteenth-century discussions –analysed in Stuart-Buttle’s, Maurer’s 
and Foster’s essays–, the relation between religion and morality may also be seen to play a 
role in Dundas’ attempt to situate public religion within a natural law framework, or in 
Keith’s claim that a Christian core remained unchanged in spite of confessional shifts.  
Famously, debates on liberty of conscience and its limits constitute another crucial 
context for arguments for and against tolerance – these debates appear in all contributions to 
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this special issue. Reformed theologians and philosophers emphatically insisted that there 
must be (some sort of) liberty of conscience. God alone was the lord of the conscience, and 
neither the Pope of Rome nor any other human institution could assume this position. 
However, the precise focus and extent of this liberty had always been a matter of heated 
dispute: was this liberty a genuinely individual liberty, as most famously argued by Pierre 
Bayle in his account of the rights of the erring conscience, or was it, rather, a liberty of a 
church, of an institution constituted by a body of believers and united by a confession of 
faith? The latter conception would be compatible with granting the church significant 
coercive power over its members. Which were, then, the competences of a church to delimit 
the liberty of the consciences of its individual members – especially of those who, by 
appealing to conscience itself, objected to specific articles of faith? Under which conditions 
was a church legitimised to use measures such as excommunication or coercion to preserve its 
unity? And in which form could religious education and subscription be justified? 
A further question concerns the relation between church and state. In his later works on 
tolerance, Locke famously argued that the two are concerned with two entirely separate 
domains of our lives, and are thus not to interfere with one another. Besides this quite unique 
position, various opposing conceptions of how church and state were connected were 
theorised. This issue further connected with other debates, for example debates on the right of 
resistance to political power, on which institution –church or state– was to take the lead in 
religious education, and on whether toleration was really grounded in an individual right to 
liberty of conscience. Furthermore, the question of the possibility and the need for 
establishing a national church transcended the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the 
contributions by Ferlier, Hutton and Foster demonstrate. Both Keith (Ferlier) and 
Witherspoon (Foster) had first hand experiences of the differences between Britain and 




4. The contributions and their perspectives 
 
Aaron Denlinger investigates the complex positions on tolerable and intolerable 
tolerance, and thus on the limits of tolerance, developed by the so-called Aberdeen Doctors, a 
group of divines and academics active in Aberdeen until the Covenanter revolution. The 
Doctors set out to promote concord between Reformed and Lutheran churches both 
domestically and internationally on the basis of a shared core of fundamental doctrines, and of 
tolerance regarding less non-fundamental ones. Their views on tolerance are an inevitably 
complex attempt to foster agreement between confessionally close yet bitterly divided parties, 
and the opposition met by their proposals are a telling lesson about the difficulties of 
tolerance, both in principle and in practice. 
Simon Burton looks at the Free Disputation Against Pretended Liberty of Conscience 
(1649) by Samuel Rutherford (c.1600–1661), a leading theorist of the Covenanter revolution 
and a member of the Westminster Assembly (1643-47). In conflictual Britain of the 1640s 
and 1650s, Rutherford makes the contentious point that all actions which undermine the unity 
of the church are intolerable. Therefore, a Christian has the religious duty not to forbear such 
actions. Burton sheds new light on Rutherford by exploring the roots in the conciliarist 
movement of his positions on conscience and resistance. In Burton’s reading, Rutherford 
takes on the role of antagonist of contractualism, epitomised by Locke. 
In his essay, Giovanni Gellera gives the first account of the Idea philosophiae moralis 
(1679) by the Scottish judge James Dundas, First Lord Arniston (c.1620-1679) on the subject 
of tolerance. As a Covenanter, Dundas went into home exile after the Restoration. The Idea is 
an incomplete manuscript in the tradition of Reformed scholasticism. Drawing from 
Scriptures, Stoicism, classical jurisprudence and his negative assessment of Hobbes, Dundas 
formulates a theory of duties in a strong natural law framework. Tolerance, with Pauline and 
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Stoic influences, is a virtue worthy of a Christian because it is a mark of a strong and hopeful 
character. The same moral and psychological attitude forms the ground for a political 
dimension of tolerance, applicable to law-abiding Christians. The limits of tolerance would 
then be the infractions of the main duties towards god, self and others, as expressed in the 
natural law. 
In her essay on Sir John Finch (1626–1682), Sarah Hutton also tackles previously 
unstudied territory. The English-born anatomist, diplomat and materialist Finch, who was in 
some respects close to Henry More (1614–1687), lived most of his life in Italy and Turkey, 
and thus got acquainted with various geographical, cultural and religious differences. More 
claims that liberty of conscience forbids Christians to persecute and should even make us 
examine our own religious principles. Finch’s discussion of liberty of conscience, as 
expounded in his unpublished notebooks, emphasises the importance of conforming to one’s 
‘inner principle’. His broad understanding of this point, and his account of the limits of 
political and ecclesiastical power on individual conscience seem marked by his international 
experience. His criticism of the Catholic church is combined with a fascination for its high 
level of civility, which has Roman and thus pre-Christian roots. The family ties between John 
Finch and Daniel Finch, who was responsible for the Toleration Act, suggest that there may at 
least have been remote links between their ideas. 
In her essay, Louisiane Ferlier recounts and analyses the intellectual and geographical 
journeys of George Keith (1639-1716). Keith was a pamphleteer, a religious proselytiser and 
a convert to Presbyterianism, Quakerism, and Latitudinarian Anglicanism. His life and travels 
covered Scotland, the United Provinces, the American colonies and England. Influenced by 
Henry More on tolerance and by Quakerism on immediate revelation and pacifism, Keith 
became a strong advocate of liberty of conscience and toleration, which he considered as 
necessary for the defence of the Protestant faith. He held firm to these beliefs across the many 
changes of confessions and places which make his life so remarkable. Ferlier argues that 
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Keith represents a fitting case study of how different geographical loci can shape ideas of 
toleration, and how his message and strategies adapted to new audiences and challenges.  
In his essay on the Scottish theologian and philosopher Archibald Campbell (1691–
1756) and his connections with seventeenth-century theories of natural law, Tim Stuart-Buttle 
connects debates on tolerance with early modern theories of recognition. Stuart-Buttle 
contextualises Campbell’s reaction to Hobbes’ claim that our desire for recognition by others 
causes conflicts and war, and that hence political authority is required to create a context in 
which mutual recognition and tolerance is possible. Campbell builds on the natural law 
theorist Richard Cumberland (1631–1718), and emphasises that our natural desire for esteem 
or recognition may be corrupted in civilised societies, if religious opinions are bestowed with 
secular advantages. Toleration regarding disagreement becomes necessary only if political 
and ecclesiastic powers become entangled to enforce conformity to religious doctrines. 
Otherwise, the natural economy of esteem will engender mutual charity and forbearance. 
In his essay on the debates on tolerance in early eighteenth-century Scotland, Christian 
Maurer argues that the Westminster Confession of Faith, penned from 1643 until 1647, which 
was reintroduced in the 1690s as the official creed of the Church of Scotland, occupied an 
ambiguous role. The Confession asserted liberty of conscience in anti-Catholic contexts, yet it 
imposed rigid boundaries on this liberty in order to preserve the unity of the Kirk. In early 
eighteenth-century arguments for and against tolerance regarding doctrinal issues, both poles 
were used: the orthodox Committee for Purity of Doctrine accused theologians such as John 
Simson (1667–1740) and Archibald Campbell (1691–1756) of heresies, who defended 
themselves by insisting on passages in the Confession granting liberty of conscience. 
Philosophers such as George Turnbull and Francis Hutcheson argued for giving preference to 
the state in religious education. 
The Westminster Confession of Faith appears again as a central document in James 
Foster’s essay. Foster describes the development of John Witherspoon (1722–1794), who is 
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best known as the author of the Ecclesiastical Characteristics (1753), a satirical pamphlet 
directed against the members of the so-called Moderate Party in the Kirk, decrying them as 
followers of Shaftesbury and the Stoics rather than of Jesus. When becoming president of the 
College of New Jersey in 1768, Witherspoon contributed to amending the Confession of 
Faith, arguing now for a strong separation between state and church, and opposing the 
establishment of a national church in the American context. Foster argues that Witherspoon is 
in favour of liberty of conscience, and, with his opposition against the establishment of a 
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